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0. Introduction: Logic, Natural Language and the Psychology of
Reasoning
In introduction, we would like to focus on the distinction between three different 
levels: a logical relation, a (logical) formalization of this relation, and the way 
natural language expresses this relation. By analyzing the relations between these 
three levels, we would like to present the aims and the complexity of the 
psychology of reasoning’s program. 
0.1.  Logical Implication, Material Conditional and SI-Clauses 
Let us look at the following example: 
(1) Paris est la capitale de la France et Berlin la capitale de l’Allemagne, 
Paris is the capital of France and Berlin is the capital of Germany 
From this sentence, everybody agrees to conclude with: 
(2) Donc, Paris est la capitale de la France. (Ou Donc Berlin est la 
capitale de l’Allemagne). 
Then, Paris is the capital of France (Or Berlin is the capital of 
Germany) 
In the same way, everybody agrees to accept as logically true the following 
conditional statement: 
(3) Si Paris est la capitale de la France et Berlin la capitale de 
l’Allemagne,  
Alors Paris est la capitale de la France. 
If Paris is the capital of France and Berlin is the capital of Germany,  
Then Paris is the capital of France. 
Everybody seems to agree to say that (3) has to be understood as a true statement. 
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What allows us to recognize (3) as true does not depend on a specific 
formalization, nor on a definite logic.  It is not necessary to be a trained logician 
to accept as true this statement. Both the naïve subject and the great 
mathematician would admit that we have a relation of logical entailment at work. 
Moreover, we can see that this relation does not rely on what is specifically 
expressed in this example. We consider (2) as a logical consequence of (1) 
because of their logical form. Then, by keeping the same form in both the premise 
and the apodosis, we must get the same logical consequence relationship between 
them. So from any A and B statement, we can (or must) infer A or B. 
So from a relationship between two particular statements, we got to a 
relationship between two forms, and what justifies that anybody accepts (3) as 
true is its very form. 
Then, what logic does is trying to express this consequence relation by 
determining which forms activate it. It is not about constructing this relation, but 
about characterizing it in using the form of the statements that activate it. For 
doing it, Classical Logic develops a connector called material conditional. 
The logical approach is a vericonditional one, which means that it is interested 
in truth conditions. Material conditional is then defined by its truth table, which is 
the following: 
 
P Q P  Q 
V V V 
V F F 
F V V 
F F V 
 
This truth table is grounded on the idea that the truth of the premise has to be 
transmitted to the apodosis, so when P is true, Q has to be true as well, and the 
only case in which the conditional statement is considered to be false is then the 
one in which P is true and Q is not. 
But, this truth table was built for material conditional, not for SI-clauses and 
IF-clauses.  
So we have three different things: 
 
- A logical relation of necessary entailment (logical implication) 
- A formalization of this relation (material conditional) 
- Natural language IF-Clauses 
 
We think that the main epistemological problem that psychology of reasoning has 
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0.2.  Psychology of Reasoning 
There are two different aims for psychology of reasoning. The first one is to 
specify the relation between logic and reasoning by testing subjects’ reasoning 
abilities. The second one, which is strongly related to the first one, is to examine 
the hypothesis of a mental logic1 that would be internal to the brain.  The 
hypothesis of a Mental Logic claims that logic is no longer thought as a 
formalisation or as a characterization of external laws. On the contrary, these laws 
are supposed to be first and subjects are tested to check if their reasoning is really 
congruent with the formalization proposed by logic.  
The weak one tries to determine whether or not ordinary conditionals in si…, 
alors or in if…, then correspond to material conditionals, which is to determine 
whether or not the way subjects understand expressions associated with logical 
implication (si… alors clauses) correspond to its characterization in terms of 
material conditionals.  
On the contrary, the strong version tries to determine whether or not the 
subjects right in their understanding. 
We consider that the second approach is irrelevant, since material conditionals 
and rules associated with them are not primitive: they have been built in order to 
express logical implication, but the ambiguity between these two different 
versions seems to be an impediment in the analysis that have been proposed to the 
results. 
 
1.  Wason Selection Task (WST), 1966. 
1.1.  Presentation of the Task 
In its paradigmatic version, the Wason Selection task consists in presenting four 
cards to the subjects. Each card is known to have a letter on one side and a 
number on the other side. Two of these cards are presented to the subjects with 
the letter side up, and two with the number side up. The subjects can read the 
following inscriptions on the four cards: A, D, 7, and 8. They are told that the rule 
is: If there is an A on one side, there is a 7 on the other one and they are asked to 
determine which card(s) it is necessary and sufficient to turn over to judge 





                                                 
1 See Braine, P. and O'Brien, D. 1998 
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The expected answers are the A-card and the 8-card, since if there were an A on 
the other side of the 8-card, it would falsify the rule. But, if most subjects decide 
to pick up the A-card (P card), 90% of them fail to choose the 8-card (Not-Q 
card). Actually, more people choose to pick-up the 7-card (Q card) 
The WST became famous because of these so-called bad results, and the 
question that arose was to understand why the subjects fail. 
In order to answer this question, other versions have been proposed that were 
more familiar versions (Cosmides and Tooby 1992) or deontic versions (Griggs 
and Cox 1982). 
But there are two different ways of understanding these results that 
corresponds to the two versions of the psychology of reasoning program for 
conditionals. 
Then first way of understanding these results, which corresponds to the strong 
version of the program, would be to refute any logical ability to the subjects. It 
seems however unsatisfactory, since subjects do manifest logical abilities in 
everyday life, even if they are “logically naïve.” Moreover, as we said, the 
material conditional has been built on the basis of what was recognized as true by 
everyone: thus the implication relation is a relation that subjects are able to 
perceive. 
The second way is by postulating a gap between what the experimenter wants 
to test and what is actually tested. That would correspond to the weak version. If 
we agree to this understanding, as we do, we now have to determine what is 
actually tested in this task. 
The first answer to this question is given by Sperber, Cara and Girotto (1995), 














- Each card has a letter on one side and a number on the other side  
- The subjects are told the rule: If there is an A on one side, there is a 7 
on the other one 
- Task: specify which card(s) it is necessary and sufficient to turn over to 
judge whether the rule is true.  
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1.2.  A Pragmatic Analysis of the Wason Selection Task  
Sperber, Cara and Girotto (1999) propose a pragmatic analysis of the Wason 
selection task using relevance principles. This analysis is grounded on five 
hypotheses: 
 
- Subjects understand the task as one of selecting potentially relevant 
evidence for evaluating the truth of the rule.  
- Subjects envisage evaluating the rule in the only possible way, that is, 
indirectly, through its observationally testable consequences. 
- Inferring some of the consequences of any statement is done 
spontaneously, as part of the process of comprehension, in order to arrive 
at relevant-as-expected interpretation. 
- Subjects trust their intuitions, that is the output of their spontaneous 
inferential abilities; they take the directly testable consequences that they 
have inferred to be the consequences through which the rule should be 
tested.  
- Subjects select the cards the observation of which may directly test these 
spontaneously derived consequences     (Sperber, Cara and Girotto 1999) 
 
By applying these principles, it seems natural to pick the A-card, and possibly the 
7-card.  Using their hypothesis, Sperber, Cara and Girotto set up easy experiments 
that respect the general rules of the Wason selection task and that are answered 
successfully by the subjects.  So what Sperber et al. tell us is that this task is not 
testing the subjects’ abilities to understand and apply conditional statements, at 
least as they are understood by classical logic. 
However, the rule in the Wason Selection Task is formulated as a conditional 
statement (If P then Q / Si P, alors Q), which is generally understood as 
corresponding to material implication.  We are going to examine what it could 
teach us about the meaning of IF.  
 
1.3.  What do the WST’s Results Tell Us about the Meaning of If? 
We have seen that the task does not test the ability of understanding and applying 
conditionals. The subjects do not understand this task as a reasoning task, and 
depend on their intuitions to solve he problem, while experimenters would like 
subjects to rebuild the truth table of material implication.  But this aim depends on 
the assumption that material implication and its “translation” in natural language 
(If…then / Si…alors statements) do coincide, which does not seem to be the case.  
The Wason selection task tests the subjects’ understanding of If…then / Si…alors 
statements, and shows us that this understanding differs from the one associated 
with material conditional. 
Thus, subjects are not wrong, and their answer help us specify the meaning of 
If /Si.  That is the reason why we would like to introduce now our semantic 
analysis of the Wason selection task. 
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2.  A Semantic Analysis of the Wason Selection Task 
We believe that the results can be explained in a very simple way: Subjects do 
what they are told to do. They understand the rule as an If (or Si)-clause, rather 
than as a material conditional.  We base this interpretation on a study of SI-
clauses in French, which allows us to classify them into four classes of uses. 
In order to introduce our semantic analysis of these results, we will now 
briefly present this classification2. 
 
2.1.  A Study of SI-Clauses 
The classification we propose is made up with four classes of uses: 
 
- The enunciative uses  
- The hypothetical uses 
- The concessive uses 
- The comparative uses 
 
The idea pertaining to this study is that the SI-clauses work as space 
constructors (Dancygier and Sweetser 2005), and we characterize the space set up 
by SI as a transitory frame for the apodosis.   In using this understanding of the SI-
clauses, we can show how we can reinterpret the subjects’ answers to the 
selection task as a proper understanding of the instructional meaning of SI, as well 
as a proper understanding of the instructional meaning of IF.  
 
2.2.  Enunciative Uses: Discourse Conventions 
The enunciative uses work as discourse conventions set up in the protasis that 
make the enunciation of the apodosis possible. This possibility is an enunciative 
possibility: the protasis can provide either acceptability conditions for the 
apodosis (metalinguistic uses) or relevancy conditions (speech act uses). 
 
Metalinguistic comment on what is said: 
The first category of enunciative uses is the metalinguistic comments, which can 
concern: 
- A single term in the apodosis, as in the following examples: 
 
(4) Faut-il signaler encore un pneu non pas increvable, mais qui se rit – 
 SI l’on peut dire – de la crevaison ? (H. Tinard, L'Automobile)  
(5) I consider this work, if you permit me, to be rather good.  
 
- The whole apodosis: 
 
(6) Il manquait de conscience et, SI l'on excepte son amitié pour Robert, il 
 n'avait pas de fidélité. (Georges Bataille, l’abbé C). 
                                                 
2 for more details, see Aptekman 2008 
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(7) Such, unfortunately, is the case, if we except perhaps the admirable list 
 of editions due to the great Panizzi (NY Times book review) 
 
- A language convention 
 
(8) SI les transports publics sont la vie d’une ville, Vancouver est dans le 
 coma. 
(9) If public transit is the lifeblood of a dynamic city, Vancouver is in a 
 coma (cited in Dancygier & Sweetser 2005) 
  
Speech act conditionals: 
 
(10) SI tu as soif, il y a de la bière dans le frigo 
(11) If you’re thirsty, there is beer in the fridge 
 
2.3.  Hypothetic Uses 
We distinguish these enunciative uses from the hypothetic ones that involve cases 
in which the protasis activates (déclenche) the apodosis in a factual or in an 
inferential way. In the first case, we will talk about hypothetico-prospective uses, 
and in the second one, we would say that the uses are inferential. 
 
Hypothetico-prospective uses 
We call ‘hypothetico-prospective’ the uses that involve a notion of prediction, by 
presenting the protasis as potential. 
  
(12) Si je gagne au loto, j’achèterai une voiture / Si je gagnais au loto, 
 j’achèterais une voiture 
(13) If I win the lottery, I’ll buy a car / If I won the lottery, I’d buy a car 
  
Hypothetico-deductive conditionals and explicative uses: inferential uses 
We also consider as hypothetic some uses that are not prospective, but in which 
the protasis still activate the apodosis, even if it is not in a factual way. 
We consider as hypothetico-deductive uses the uses that express a prediction 
that is neither temporal nor predictive (14), and the uses that are usually 
considered as explicative3 or epistemic4 ones (15 and 16). 
  
(14) Ecoute, Antoine, tu diras tout ce que tu veux, moi je sors pas de là : SI 
 tu obliques, tu vas pas tout droit! (Alain Robbe-Grillet, Les Gommes, 
 1952) 
(15) If you turn right, you don’t go straight 
(16) S’il est riche, c’est qu’il a dû magouiller pas mal 
                                                 
3 Cf. De Vogüe 1986. 
4 Cf. Dancygier et Sweetser 2005. 
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(17) If he was running, he must have been guilty (Internet) 
(18) If ever there was a good Yankee, he must have been Irish (Internet) 
 
2.4.  Concessive Uses: Non Efficient Cause and Limit Condition 
The third class of uses we distinguish gathers concessive uses. In such uses, what 
is expressed in the protasis allows what is expressed in the apodosis despite an 
implicit entailment (thwarted) that would assert If P, not Q. 
In these uses the protasis sets up a frame in which the apodosis unexpectedly 
holds. 
 
(19) Je n’ai le droit de le dire à personne, même SI au fond tout le monde 
 s’en fout… 
(20) SI Jake et Chuckie sont les personnages centraux du roman, ce serait 
 faire injure à Mac Liam Wilson d’oublier la palette d’individus tous 
 plus extravagants les uns que les autres. (Book review on the Internet) 
(21) Toutefois, l’union - fruits, SI elle est en constantes relations avec le 
 conseil supérieur de la conserve, a une gestion absolument 
 indépendante.  
(L'industrie des conserves en France, 1950) 
(22) Even if something is not true, if it's repeated loudly and publicly 
 enough, people tend to start believing the lie. (Internet website) 
  
2.5.  Comparative Uses: Comparison Scale (specific to French) 
The last class we would like to introduce gathers the comparative uses that 
introduce a comparison between the protasis and the apodosis. 
In these uses, the SI seems to connect the protasis and the apodosis without 
placing them in an inferential relation. So these uses are very different from the 
concessive ones since they d not refer to an implicit (thwarted) entailment. On the 
contrary, they put the two propositions in parallel, on a common scale.  
In English, it could be translated by while: 
 
(23) SI Jean est adorable, Lucie est insupportable 
~ While Jean was charming, Lucie was impossible 
 
(24) Je ne nie point que SI vingt métiers font la misère, vingt aventures font 
 la solitude.  
(Hervé Bazin, La Mort du petit cheval)  
 
3. Conclusion: SI Introduces a Transitory Frame for the Apodosis and 
 Subjects Understand IF-Clauses in the WST 
In all these uses, we can consider SI as providing a frame for the apodosis, and 
this frame must be understood as transitory. This frame is built in the protasis in 
order to interpret the apodosis. 
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Based on this hypothesis it is easy to reinterpret the WST’s results: they 
appear to show that subjects d understand If/Si-clauses. Actually, almost all 
subjects pick up the A card, that is the frame P card. By doing this, they set up a 
frame that corresponds to the one set up by the apodosis. Then a large part of 
them chooses to turn over the 7 card, which is the apodosis Q card. They consider 
the apodosis within the protasis frame. So by choosing the P-card and the Q card, 
subjects do exactly what SI-clauses tell us to do: they use P as a frame, and they 
consider what happens in this frame. 
In this understanding, the 8-card (Not-Q card) is out of the protasis frame, and 
subjects have no reason to choose it. If/Si-clauses semantics does not allow 
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